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- 3 -1-Summary 
Nuclear energy production  in  the  CEEC/CIS1  is  of great  importance,  as  it  is  essential  for 
many  of these  countries  and  represents  for  some of them  a  substantial  part  of their  total 
electricity production,  and  at  the same time is  of great concern,  as  Soviet-de..<;igned  nuclear 
installations do not generally meet Western safety standards. 
The purpose of this Commission paper is  not to  produce a  further  nuclear energy report  in 
addition to those already issued by various institutions and  international organisations, but to 
draw operational conclusions on the basis of existing information, taking  into  account,  inter 
alia,  the economic development of the CEEC/CIS  and  the security of energy  supply to  the 
European Union. 
Although it is  clear that Soviet-designed nuclear installations generally pose safety problems, 
the situation varies according to reactor types and to the way they are operated, as  well  as the 
countries concerned : 
VVER-230 and  RBMK  reactors show fundamental  design deficiencies  which  cannot  be 
fully  overcome,  whereas  VVER-213  and  -320  reactors  can  be  substantially  upgraded, 
notwithstanding the questionable design of some plant components; 
the  regulatory,  technological,  engineering  and  industrial  environment  varies  from  one 
country to the other; 
the  substantial  nuclear  electricity  dependence  in  some  countries  acts  as  a  further 
constraint contributing to a continuation of potential risk. 
The diversity  of local  situations  makes  it  necessary  to  adopt  different  approaches,  which 
should nevertheless be part of a coherent framework,  in order to  maximise the effectiveness 
of the financial  assistance made available by the European Union and  more generally by the 
international community to assist CEEC/CIS countries in  their own efforts to  solve nuclear 
problems. This report i~ intended to contribute to the achievement of this coherence. 
The safety analyses are well  advanced. In addition to urgent activities which are justified by 
exceptional  and  transitory  situations,  it  is  now  necessary  to  develop  a  longer  term 
perspective, including investment and industrial co-operation. Union assistance activities will 
have to  contain certain  requirements  in  order to  reinforce their coherence and  effectiveness 
including: 
guidelines  to  be  agreed  with  each  of the  recipient  countries,  in  order  to  secure  an 
environment  more  conducive  to  investment,  to  analyse  and  prioritise  projects  and  to 
ensure rationality and therefore cost-effectiveness; 
conditionalities of Union financing  in order to  ensure that safety objectives are properly 
met and  that  assistance  and  investments  lead  to  the shut down of less  safe· reactors  as 
early as is feasible. 
I  Central and Eastern European Countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States. 2 - Introduction 
This  paper  is  based  on  existing  information  on  the  status  of nuclear  power  plants  in  the 
CEEC/CIS, including a recent report2 issued by the World Bank, the IAEA and the EBRD at 
the  request  of the  G7.  This  paper  is  not  intended  to  propose a  complete  solution  to  the 
nuclear safety problem in  these countries. Rather,  it  underlines the Union's concerns, places 
nuclear  matters  in  a  global  energy  context,  briefly  describes the nuclear safety situation  in 
these  countries,  reviews  the  assistance  activities  of  the  European  Union  and  of  the 
international community and  recommends guidelines to the Union. 
This paper allows the Commission to  inform the Council  and  the Parliament about  its  own 
work and the Union to contribute to the G-7 and G-24 exercises. 
The CEEC and  CIS,  viewed  in  aggregate,  are rich  in  all  energy  resources  with  noticeable 
national variations.  Energy in  general, and  the electricity sector in particular, will  be a key 
ingredient in  the development of these countries,  both  reflecting and  affecting the speed of 
economic  reform.  However,  these  countries  are  faced  with  energy  industries  which  have 
suffered  long  term  under-investment  and  which  are  generally  operating  in  unstable 
environments. 
Many of the CEEC/CIS depend  to  a greater or Jesser  extent on self generated or imported 
nuclear  power.  While Russia  has  intimated  its  nuclear  reactors  are safe,  the  international 
community universally recognises  that there are fundamental  weaknesses  in  the design  and 
operation, particularly in old reactors, in comparison to those in the West. 
Russia, possessing the largest number of the oldest reactors, has publicly stated that it intends 
to continue with  large-scale development of its own nuclear power technology.  In the mean 
time it intends to  continue to use its  oldest reactors to  the end of their design lives,  notably 
the  RBMKs3,  of which  it  has  eleven  currently  in  operation.  This  position  was  recently 
confirmed by Mr Mikhailov  (Minister of Minatom) at the European Parliament.  Russia has 
therefore established a nuclear reactor rehabilitation programme and intends to carry it out, if 
necessary  without external  financial  support.  As  concerns  Ukraine,  its  parliament recently 
voted to continue operating the undamaged Chemobyl nuclear reactors (RBMK), overturning 
an earlier vote to close down the whole site. 
To  varying  degrees,  other  countries  also  have  rehabilitation  programmes.  While  some 
countries are largely able to  cope with this task within their own engineering and  industrial 
capability, others require comprehensive external assistance since historically they have been 
dependent  on  Russian  technology  and  expertise.  Consequently  the  CEEC/CIS,  while 
recognising  the  commonality of certain  problems  and  the  need  for  co-ordination,  must  be 
viewed separately in terms of assistance required from the West. 
2 Nuclear Safety and Electric Power in  Annenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine, 
May 1993. The summary of this report is contained in annex C. 
3 See section 4.2 for more detail. 
- 5-The European Union's assistance is driven by certain basic concerns: 
the safety of citizens, both of the CEEC/CIS and the EU, in  the event of further nuclear 
accidents; 
the  recognition  that  a  further  major  incident  involving  a  nuclear  power  plant  in  an 
Eastern country would undermine the nuclear power sector in EU Member States, which 
produce a large percentage of electricity; 
the need to protect the process of economic development in the CEEC/CIS; 
the  weakness  of the  regulatory  environment  in  the  CEEC/CIS,  whereas  a  strong 
environment is needed to encourage inward investment to these countries; 
the need to ensure security of energy sup.ply to the EU (in particular gas, cf. annex C). 
Since 1990 the European Union has been assisting CEEC/CIS to  improve the safety of their 
less safe Soviet-designed reactors, in  particular through the PHARE and TACIS programmes 
for a total of 314 MECU. At the G7  summit in  Munich, a strategy to improve nuclear safety 
was agreed, containing immediate measures and  longer term safety improvements. A number 
of countries of the G24 are working bilaterally with the same objective. Co-ordination of this 
effort is pursued within the process of the G24, managed by the Commission. 
-6-3 - The energy context in the CEEC/CIS 
The  efficient  supply  and  consumption  of  energy  services  is  vital  for  stable  economic 
development and for maintenance of an acceptable standard of living. Taken in  aggregate, the 
CEEC/CIS  have  enormous  energy  resources,  but  on  an  individual  country  basis  there  are 
great  differences  in  energy  wealth,  with  most  fossil  fuel  reserves  on  Russian  territory. 
Among  those  countries  that  have  few  indigenous  energy  resources,  and  are  historically 
dependent  on  Russia  for  their  energy  supply,  there  is  a  desire  to  create  greater  energy 
autonomy, and to diversify their supply base. 
3.1- Electricity sector ovenoiew 
Most of the CEEC/CIS are in  economic crisis,  and  overall  energy demand  is  in  decline.  In 
the electricity sector, the  most  realistic  forecasts  suggest that demand  will  continue to  fall, 
and that 1988-1989 levels of electricity consumption will not be reached before the turn of the 
century or later, with, of course, considerable variation depending of the speed of reform  in 
each country. 
The electricity sector is  a key  factor  in  the economic recovery of these countries, since any 
electricity shortage may have a very damaging  impact on economic growth, and  experience 
shows that efficiency improvements, the modernisation of industry and  increasing prosperity 
lead  to  an  increasing  share  of  electricity  in  the  overall  energy  balance.  Most  of the 
CEEC/CIS  have  electricity  consumption  profiles  which  still  reflect  the  predominance  of 
heavy  industry,  with  typically  half or  more  of  power  consumed  by  industry.  As  the 
economics  develop  and  wealth  increases,  this  balance  is  expected  to  change  to  a 
predominance by the  domestic  and  tertiary  sectors,  in  line  with  EU  experience  in  recent 
years. This shift  in  electricity  demand  should  be  offset  by  a  reduction  in  energy  intensity 
accompanying the gradual implementation of economic pricing and market competition. 
Inter  fuel  substitution  can  reduce  dependency  on  risky  nuclear  generation,  but  has  some 
constraints. TI1e  typical  alternatives to  nuclear power arc (i)  local  coal  and  lignite  and  (ii) 
imported natural gas- except in the case of Russia. The potential problems could include : 
Substitution  by  coal  and  lignite  will  be  accompanied  by  increasing  pollution,  unless 
considerable investment is made in new technology. 
Substitution by natural  gas  (i)  has  some negative  environmental  impacts,  although  less 
than  other  options,  (ii)  requires  development  or  extension  of  an  expensive  supply 
infrastructure, (iii) in  the short to  medium term, exacerbates rigidities in  supply options, 
and (iv) has negative effects on the balance of payments for net importers. 
3.2 - Nuclear nower within the electn.city sector 
TilC  dependence on  nuclear generated  electricity  for  some of the CEEC/CIS  is  presented  in 
the following  table  (1991  data).  It  should  of course be noted  that  these  figures  arc  rather 
variable from year to year. 
- 7 -Country  Total electricity  Nuclear 
generation (1991)  dependence 
1Wb  (%) 
Bulgaria  40  34 
Czech and Slovak Republics  85  29 
Hungary  37  43 
Kazakhstan  1 
Lithuania  19.5  60 
Russia4  1067  11 
Ukraine  256  27 
Source: lEA report 
In developing strategies to  address  nuclear safety  issues  in the CEEC/CIS,  it  is  necessary  to 
have a consistent framework for all the countries concerned, within which specific approaches 
are needed for individual countries, according to local conditions.  For example the approach 
(at  least  in  the  short/medium  term)  cannot  be  the same  with  Russia,  with  large  fossil  fuel 
reserves,  Lithuania,  dependent  on  its  export  revenues,  and  Ukraine,  where  excess  installed 
generation capacity allows for some flexibility. 
As  electricity production from existing  nuclear reactors has  low  marginal  cost,  it  is  likely  to 
remain  the  least  cost option,  in  the short or medium  term,  particularly  for  those  countries 
otherwise dependent on fossil  fuel  imports. In the event of the closure of their unsafe reactors 
and sustained electricity demand,  countries would  have to  invest  in  new  generation capacity, 
and  in some cases increase their purchase of imported fuels to be paid for  in hard currencies. 
Adoption  of  Western  environmental  standards  will  also  necessitate  implementation  of 
expensive technologies, which would not be compensated by any revenue collection. 
Many  of  the  CEEC/CIS  countries  claim  nuclear  power  is  an  important  element  in 
safeguarding their  long  term  self~sufficiency. Using  Russian  technology  would,  even  if the 
safety  systems  are  improved  in  the  more  recent  designs,  increase  dependency  on  Russia, 
while using Western European designs (or others) would be safer but more costly. 
4 Note that most of the NPPs are located in the Center/Northwest regions and less safe reactors (RBMK 
and VVER-230) alone account for 17% of the total electricity production of these regions. 
-8-4 - Status of Nuclear Safety in the CEEC/CIS 
4,1 - General Safety Assessment in the CEEC/CIS 
There is  a general deficit as  regards "safety culture" as it is understood in Western countries, 
where it encompasses all  elements and actors contributing to safety, including manufacturers, 
utilities and safety authorities. The following section spells out some of the problems noted in 
this respect in  the CEEC/CIS. The situation can  vary substantially from  country to  country 
depending,  inter  alia,  on  the  respective  levels  of technological  competence,  quality  of 
suppliers, organisation of public authorities and degree of safety culture. It  is  not within the 
scope of this document to present a specific assessment per country or per power plant. 
4.1 .a - Regulatory Framework 
The  importance  of  legally  based,  independent,  technically  strong  and  well  resourced 
regulatory authorities is internationally recognised as a necessary basis for safety. 
Regulatory authorities 
The  centrally-planned  economy  of  the  ex-USSR  did  not  favour  the  development  of 
independent  nuclear  regulatory  authorities.  The  problem  is  generic  but  has  country 
specificities  related  to  the  presence  or absence  of an  appropriate  scientific  and  technical 
infrastructure to provide specialised support to nuclear safety authorities, as  well  as  adequate 
staffing and budgeting. 
Exploratory missions by nuclear regulators of Union Member States have confirmed the need 
for Union co-ordinated near term assistance to nuclear safety authorities and a long term co-
operation aimed at the diffusion of a safety culture by means of the Regulatory Assistance 
Management  (RAM)  and  Concertation  on  European  Regulatory  Tasks  ("CONCERT") 
Groups. 
Regulations 
In  CEEC/CIS,  basic  legislation  on  institutional  and  technical  arrangements  is  sometimes 
incomplete and administrative procedures are generally loose, and the necessary independent 
role of safety authorities  is  not  yet  firmly  rooted.  This  inadequate  regulatory  environment 
causes concerns as does the non-adherence of some countries to  international conventions on 
nuclear safety (see subsequent sections). 
4.l.b -Design Safety 
Design 
Before  addressing  the  main  characteristics  and  deficiencies  of each  type  of reactors  (see 
section 4.2), it can be noted that Soviet-designed reactors generally do not apply the rules and 
practices  common  in  Western  countries,  particularly  the  defence-in-depth  principle.  This 
principle consists of (i)  preventing accidents  by  the quality of design and  construction,  (ii) 
controlling  the  installation  to  prevent  it  from ·leaving  its  normal  operational  limits  and 
bringing it back within those limits if necessary by adequate safety systems, and  finally  (iii) 
designing safeguard systems capable of limiting the consequences of accidents. 
-9-The defence-in-depth principle is  inadequately followed from all  three points of view for the 
VVER-230 and RBMK reactors, and from the first two points of view for the VVER-213 and 
-320. 
Construction 
Generic  problems  are  to  be  noted  as  concerns  the  construction  of power  plants  and  the 
production of equipment. These arise from  the general  lack of quality assurance policy  for 
equipment manufacturing in  factories  and  for proper installation, control and  on-site testing. 
The overall  reliability of hardware therefore  suffers  from  this  non  systematic  approach  of 
quality. 
4.l.c- Operational Safety 
Safety culture 
The general management of nuclear power plants is suboptimal and does not properly ensure 
a smooth  flow  of information.  In  particular,  NPPsS  are over-staffed  and  there  is  no  clear 
identification of responsibilities. The discipline-based relationships between different layers of 
hierarchy do not allow for necessary openness and efficient incident detection and follow-up. 
Procedures 
Operational  procedures describe the  actions  to  be  taken  when  operating  a  power  plant.  In 
clear contrast to  Western  practices,  technical  specifications  and  operational  procedures  (in 
particular  under  accident,  transient  or test  conditions)  can  be  insufficient  or  even  non-
existant.  The  modus  operandi  relies  heavily  on  the  operators'  expertise  and  therefore 
increases substantially the human error factor. 
Maintenance 
Maintenance ensures equipment reliability at any time. This implies regular control and test 
during  its  lifetime  with  preventive  control  or  upgrade  and  full  follow-up  of  various 
operations,  as  well  as  accumulation  of experience  for  all  units  of the  same  design.  This 
systematic maintenance was not properly carried out in the former Soviet Union. The present 
disruption of relationships between suppliers, designers and  operators complicates further a 
proper maintenance of the equip':llent. The quality· of maintenance can vary substantially from 
site to site even between reactors of the same type. 
Training 
It is recognised  that operators generally have an  excellent academic background.  However, 
their on-going training is insufficient in quality and quantity. Programmes of staff training are 
not well  defined  and  training  and  retraining sessions  are rare due inter alia  to  the lack  of 
facilities such as full scope simulators. 
4.2 -Types of  reactors and their safety problems 
With some exceptions6,  power plants in operation or under construction in the CEEC/CIS are 
of Soviet design. The most widespread reactor in the CEEC/CIS is the VVER, a pressurised 
water reactor the principle of which  is  similar of that Western PWRs.  The second  type of 
reactor is  the RBMK,  which  exists  in  Russia,  Ukraine (Chernobyl) and  Lithuania. Two fast 
breeder reactors exist,  in  Kazakhstan  and  Russia.  In  addition,  a large number of low power 
SN"uclear power plants. 
6  Slovenia operates a Westinghouse 660 MWe PWR at Krsko  and  Romania  is constructing five 680 
MWe PHWR (Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors of  Candu type) under a Canadian license. 
- 10-research or irradiation reactors must be taken into account within the framework of a general 
safety assessment, although they are less worrying due to their reduced power. 
4.2.n - VVER reactors 
Three generations of VVER exist : the VVER-230 (440  MWe), the VVER-213  (440 MWe) 
and the VVER-320 (1000 MWe). Each  generation has various models  : each  individual  NPP 
is  therefore  somewhat  different  and  has  specific  characteristics  which  must  be  taken  into 
account  in  the definition  of safety  improvements.  The  VVER-230  type  is  the  oldest  and 
therefore the least safe. VVER-213 and -320 are of more recent design. 
WER-230 
Ten units are still in operation in  Bulgaria, Slovakia and  Russia. According to specific expert 
findings including IAEA  7 missions,  general deficiencies include : 
•  absence of a global confinement system (replaced by casemates with discharge valves); 
•  insufficiency of  safety injection systems; 
•  vessel  embrittlement  due  to  high  neutronic  irradiation  and  poor  knowledge  of actual 
conditions of the oldest vessels; 
•  sensitivity to common mode failure due to  insufficient physical  separation of redundant 
safety systems; 
•  general  unreliability of instrumentation and  control  as  well  as  emergency power supply 
systems. 
A  series of of specific  analyses  regarding  several  of these  issues  are  currently  under  way 
under the TACIS programme 
VVER-213 
VVER-440/213  reactors  show  typically  the  same  deficiencies  as  the  previous  VVER-230 
generation but to a lesser degree. One should note that the global (third) confinement barrier 
is compensated by a bubble condenser pressure suppression system whose efficiency is yet to 
be demonstrated. The general unreliability of instrumentation and control systems should also 
be mentioned. 
A full safety assessment mission of the IAEA as well  as important analyses under the TACIS 
and PHARE programmes are being carried out and  will  deliver conclusions on other safety 
aspects in the course of 1994.  · 
VVER-320 
This is the latest generation of VVER in operation, and although the design of these reactors 
is very close to that of the Western PWRs, the insufficiencies of the control system common 
to all  Soviet-designed reactors remain,  and  are a particular cause for concern owing to the 
dynamic behaviour of the core. 
The general design of these reactors still needs to  be further analysed, particularly as experts 
have noted  a  reduction  of safety  dimensioning  margins  compared  to  previous  generations. 
Detailed  studies  on  VVER-320  design  aspects  will  shortly  be  launched  under  the TACIS 
programme. 
4.2.b - RBMK reactors 
The 1986 Chernobyl-4 accident has highlighted the fundamental design deficiencies of RBMK 
reactors  as  well  as  the  lack  of  appropriate  operating  procedures.  Since  then,  some 
improvements  have  been  made  both  in  hardware  and  operational  safety.  The  IAEA  has 
7  Ranking  of safety  issues for  WWER-440  model  230  nuclear power plallts,  IAEA-TECDOC-640, 
February 1992. 
- 11-carried  out missionss  to  investigate some  of the changes  planned  and  implemented;  these 
findings are consistent with the following deficiencies. 
This  reactor  is  a  pressure  tube  boiling  water  reactor  with  a  graphite  moderator;  it  was 
originally built for the production of military grade plutonium.  Fifteen reactors of this  type 
exist in three successive generations classified according to their power. 
The principal problems to be noted concern : 
•  the core instability due to  positive void  coefficient  at  low  power and  the possibility of 
spatial flux oscillations favoured by large core dimensions; 
•  the insufficiency of the control and shutdown systems; 
•  the  absence  of safeguard  systems  to  cope  with  the  simultaneous  rupture  of several 
channels; 
•  the absence of a global containment. 
Pending  results  of further  ongoing  safety  analyses  expected  in  the  course  of  1994,  in 
particular through the largely Union-financed  RBMK consortium,  it cannot be clearly stated 
yet whether improvements can  ever bring RBMK  reactors  to  internationally accepted  safety 
standards. 
4.2.c- Fast Breeder Reactors 
Fast breeder reactors use highly enriched  uranium as  fuel.  Two units  are in operation :  the 
BN-350  loop  reactor  (350  MWe)  located  in  Kazakhstan  and  intended  mainly  for  the 
desalination of sea water, and the BN-600 pool reactor (600 MWe) in Russia. 
Without  prejudice  to  further  analysis  of fast  breeder  reactor safety,  it  seems  that  Soviet-
designed installations do not have redundancy systems to evacuate residual heat and therefore 
show a substantial  risk of core fusion.  In  addition,  the  installations  have been deSigned  to 
resist layer sodium fires but not combined layer - spray sodium fires, which might endanger 
the integrity of the building in  case of an  accident.  Little is  yet known about the validity of 
dimensioning  calculations  or whether  accidental  situations  have  been  properly  taken  into 
account at the design phase. 
4.2.d - Other reactors in n design phase  . 
Little is  known about the development of new reactors in Russia.  According to Russia's new 
20-year  nuclear  plant  construction  plan9,  a  new  improved  RBMK-1000  unit  should  be 
constructed  at  Kursk,  VVER-320  reactors  should  have  safety  enhancements  and  be 
commissioned  at  the  turn  of the  next  century  and  new  VVER  type  reactors  should  be 
introduced  (VVER-630,  VVER-600).  It  should  also  be  noted  that  small  district  heating 
nuclear  power  plants  are  envisaged  (ACT-500,  500  MWth)  as  well  as  small  graphite 
moderated reactors cooled by light pressurised water of 32 MWe each at Bilibino. 
4.3 - Other nuclear installations 
4.3.n - Fu~l processing 
Before 1990, central and  Eastern European countries used  to send to the USSR the uranium 
ore they produced and  to  buy from  the USSR enriched fuel.  Given their national  resources, 
the Czech Republic might become an ore exporter, while Hungary and  Romania will  be able 
to  cover their national  needs.  Other CEEC depend  on foreign  imports for their ore supply. 
8 Safety Assessment of  proposed improvements to REM  K nuclear power plams - IAEI-TECDOC-694 .: 
March 1993. 
9 Source: Nucleonics Week, 21 January 1993. 
- 12-Uzbekistan,  Kazakhstan, Russia and  Ukraine produced  in  1992 some 8,500 tons of natural 
uraniuml0,  while  it  is  understood  that  Kyrghyzstan  and  Tadjikistan  are  active  in  the 
processing and milling of ores from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. All four known enrichment 
plants are located in Russia and represent about 25% of the world enrichment capacity. 
Before  1990,  the  CEEC sent  their spent  fuel  back  to  the  USSR  for  reprocessing.  Three 
reprocessing plants, located in Russia, are known. Since 1990 Russia has asked  to  be paid  in 
hard currencies for its services, and the Czech and Slovak Republics as  well  as Bulgaria are 
developing  handling  and  storage  capacities  for  spent  fueL  Ukraine  is  developing  similar 
plans. 
4.3.b - Waste treatment 
Until  recently,  most  radioactive  waste  has  been  stored  without  proper  processing  and 
packaging at production sites. Significant quantities of liquid  waste have been  injected  into 
the ground or released in Jakes, rivers and oceans. 
This approach to  waste treatment poses a serious environmental  and  health  problem for  all 
countries concerned which they must address urgently. The first waste treatment facilities are 
now under construction! I. 
10 Source: the Uranium Institute. 
11  Westinghouse has won a USD  10 million contract for the installation of the first western plant in the 
CEEC (Bulgaria) for the treatment of low level waste. 
- 13-5 - Current International Nuclear Safety Assistance to the CEEC/CIS 
5.1 - International co-ordination 
Following the report of early  1991  from  the IAEA  ASSET mission to Kozloduy,  it  became 
evident that the safety of some Soviet-designed  reactors was substantially insufficient due to 
the above-mentioned shortcomings and  was  potentially  endangering  local  and  neighbouring 
populations.  Western  countries  realised  the  urgency  of the  nuclear  safety  problem  in  the 
CEEC/CIS  and  started  devising  programmes  to  assist  the  countries  concerned  in  quickly 
tackling the matter. 
G7 
On the basis of 'intensive preparatory work by  a special  working group, the G7 endorsed at 
the Munich summit in July 1992 the following urgent action programme for nuclear safety in 
the CEEC/CIS : 
Immediate measures should be taken in the following areas : 
•  operational safety improvements 
•  near-term technical improvements to plants based on safety assessments 
•  enhancing regulatory regimes 
Longer term safety improvements should be based on the examination of : 
•  the scope for replacing less safe plants by the development of alternative energy 
sources and the more efficient use of  energy 
•  the potential for upgrading plants of more recent design. 
It was evaluated that 700 million dollars were needed over three years in order to finance the 
most urgent safety improvement measures. 
The G7  nuclear safety  working group continues  to  monitor the general  progress of actions 
linked  to  the  improvement  of safety  in  the  CEEC/CIS,  and  concentrates  now  on  the 
development of medium term safety improvements. 
G24 co-ordination 
After the G7 summit at  Munich,  the  Commission  received  the  mandate to  co-ordinate the 
assistance to CEEC/CIS of the group of the 24 industrialised countries in the field of nuclear 
safety. Recipient countries from CEEC/CIS take part in the G-24 co-ordination mechanism on 
nuclear safety, as well as international organisations, such as the International Atomic Energy 
Agency  (IAEA),  the  International  Energy  Agency  (lEA),  the  World  Bank  and  the 
EBRD/multilateral nuclear safety fund. 
The co-ordination mechanism established in September 1992 involves : 
•  a plenary Working Group composed of bilateral and multilateral donors and  all  recipient 
states. It provides an advisory forum and  develops orientations and  recommendations for 
specific actions, and 
- 14-a Steering Committee composed of representatives from  10  major donors.  A Secretariat 
staffed  by  the  Commission  and  seconded  national  experts,  whose  main  tasks  are  to 
provide adequate organisation and  documentation  and  to  maintain  and  develop  the  G-24 
database,  which  is open to all  participants and  due to  be accessible on-line at the  end  of 
this  year,  with  the  aim  of collecting  data  on  the  national  programmes  of  recipient 
countries. 
A number of technical  working groups are addressing priority issues for  co-ordination, such 
as, for example, the Kozloduy NPP, training or RBMK reactors. 
5.2 - European Union Programmes 
To  date  the  European  Union  has  committed  the  following  budgetary  resources ·tO  nuclear 
safety for the CEEC/CIS : 
Nuclear Safety  (million ofECU) 
1991  73 
1992  108 <1> 
1993  133.2 (2) 
Total  314.2 
(1)  including a  Union  contribution  of ECU  20  million  to  the International  Science  and  Technology 
Centre (ISTC) in Moscow. 
(2)  including  a  Union  contribution  of ECU  20  million  to  the  Multilateral  Nuclear  Safety  Fund 
recommended by the G7 at the Munich Summit. 
The Commission  intends to commit the necessary funds  in  1994 -subject to  the approval  of 
its budgetary proposals - to bring its total  contribution for  improving  nuclear safety over the 
four  years  from  1991  to  1994  to  about  ECU 450 million  (appr.  USD  540  million),  which 
represents more than 75%  of the USD 700 million total  recommended to  meet urgent  needs 
by  the G7  nuclear safety  working group  prior to  the Munich  summit  (for  the  period  1991-
1993). 
5.2.a - TACIS nnd PHARE Programmes 
PHAR£12 and TACJSI3 programmes have been operated since 1990 and  1991/92 respectively 
under  different  Council  Regulations.  They  cover  assistance  to  CEEC/CIS  in  all  economic 
sectors, including energy. In this respect,  technical  assistance is  carried out related to energy 
policy  advice,  modernisation  of fossil  fuel  production,  rehabilitation  of classical  thermal 
power plants, energy saving and efficiency, etc. 
As  concerns nuclear safety, the EU has developed  the  most  important assistance programme 
in the world which covers in particular (i) design studies aimed at upgrading existing less safe 
power  plants  (mainly  VVER-230  and  RBMKs)  but  also  related  to  NPPs  of more  recent 
design,  (ii) on-site  assistance  at  nine sites  (in  Russia,  Ukraine  and  Bulgaria)  with  practical 
safety  related  projects,  including  purchase  of urgent  equipment,  (iii)  assistance  to  safety 
regulatory authorities. 
12 Poland Hungary Assistance to the Restructuring of Economies : EC economic assistance programme 
covering  11  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  (Albania,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and  Slovenia). 
13 Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of lndepend:mt States and Mongolia. 
- 15-Much  expertise is  drawn  from  within  the  Union  to  assist the Commission  in  managing  the 
programmes. The Twinning Programme Engineering Group (fPEG) is comprised of the main 
nuclear operators of the EU  and  acts  as  one important technical  advisor to  the Commission. 
Close  contact  is  maintained  with  other  branches  of the  industry, such  as  NPP  constructors 
and enterprises involved  in waste management or the fuel  cycle. Regulatory authorities of the 
Member States are active as a main interlocutor for general regulatory matters. 
TACIS  and  PHARE  nuclear  safety  programmes,  managed  by  the  directorate  general  for 
external  economic  relations  in  close  collaboration  with  the  other  specialised  directorates 
general at the Commission, are explained in further detail below. 
TACIS 
+  The TACIS  1991  programme  (ECU 53 million)  consists  of 35  projects,  which  are  mainly 
generic safety studies,  i.e.  they  cover specific types  of reactor,  mainly  the less safe  RBMK 
and VVER-230 series. 
The purpose of this assistance was to develop a common understanding between Western and 
CEEC/CIS experts of the  main safety-related  design deficiencies  and  to  transfer the  modern 
Western know-how and  experience in order to  best identify technical  problems and  to devise 
appropriate solutions. 
It should be noted that generic studies are generally based on analyses of particular sites, with 
the  fmdings  being  extrapolated  to  similar  reactor  types.  In  practice,  the  majority  of the 
studies are and  will  continue to  be conducted  in Russia.  The table below gives  a breakdown 
















7.6 + 6.8 (training) 
41.8 
+ The TACIS  1992  programme  is  divided  up  as  follows  and  takes  account  of the  priorities 
proposed  by  G7  and  the  setting  up  of a Master  Plan14  with  the  assistance  of the  TPEG. 
It comprises four parts: 
Saftry of  nuclear power planLr 
1 -Operational safety (on-site assistance) 
2 • Design safety (generic studies) 
3 - Assistance to safety authorities 
4 - Master Plan 









After  difficult  negotiations  between  the  Commission  and  the  Russian  and  Ukrainian 
authorities,  the  latter  agreed  for  the  first  time  in  spring  1993  to  accept  concrete  on-site 
assistance as recommended by the G7. 
14 See below and section 6.3. 
- 16-On-site assistance implies the long term presence of experts at  NPPs and  the implementation 
of concrete  safety  improvement  measures.  This  assistance,  which  in  practical  terms  has 
involved  the presence of one or two  Union  operators  for  each  of eight sites  in  Russia  and 
Ukraine since June 1993, covers two aspects: 
•  the human  factor,  man-machine  interface  (operational  procedures,  training,  etc.) 
and more generally safety culture; 
•  improving safety  equipment  (inspection  and  control,  supply  of basic  equipment), 
up to 40%  of the budget. 
The following sites are covered by EU assistance : 
Russia 
•  Smolensk  RBMK 
RBMK  •  Sosnovy Bor (St Petersburg) 
•  Kola  VVER-230, VVER-213 
VVER-320  •  Kalin in 
•  Balakovo 
•  Beloyarsk 
Ukraine 
•  Rovno 





At the present time,  the first phase of this  activity  is  completed  or near completion  and  EU 
utilities have drawn up with the beneficiary the technical specifications for the procurement of 
equipment.  In  a second  phase  in  early  1994,  equipment  will  be  supplied  and  the  actual 
implementation of  c~rresponding assistance measures will be carried out in a third phase. 
Other  1992  activities  cover the continuation of generic safety studies  (including on  the  fuel 
cycle) and  assistance to the national  regulatory  authorities,  as  well  as  funding for  a ·Master 
Plan" covering : 
•  framing  an  overall strategy for  planning,  building,  running  and  decommissioning 
power plants, for and with the CEEC/CIS authorities; 
•  defining Union assistance in the medium term; 
•  additionally  (after  taking  stock  of current  work)  carrying  out studies  to  aid  the 
overall  policy  review  required  by  the  Master  Plan.  This  will  look  at  plant 
operation in the context of the nuclear chain, from mineral extraction through  fuel 
processing to  waste management,  and  reconsider nuclear generation of electricity 
compared  with  alternative  energy  sources  via  studies  of input  costs,  prices  and 
environmental impact. 
+  The TACIS  1993 programme will  be submitted for opinion to  the Member States by the end 
of the year.  Plans  include  a continuation  of the  on-site  component  (both  general  assistance 
and  specific projects) at the eight sites and  inclusion of a ninth site (Zaporozhe,  Ukraine).  In 
addition,  it  is  anticipated  that design safety projects  will  be  complemented and  assistance to 
the Russian and Ukrainian regulatory authorities strengthened. Waste treatment and fuel  cycle 
studies are proposed, as well  as safety assessments of fast breeder reactors. 
- 17-PH ARE 
The PHARE  programmes  for  1990,  1991  and  1992  include  both  on-site  assistance  and 
generic studies. 
PHARE Nuclear Safety Programme (ECU  million)  1990  1991  1992 
1 -Operational safety (on-site assistance)  6  15.8 
2- Design safety (generic studies)  3.8  8.5  5 
3 - Assistance to safety authorities  1  6.5 
4- Regional waste management policy  1.2  2 
Total  3.8  16.7  29.3 
•  Bulgaria 
For 1991, the EU financed an emergency programme on the Kozloduy power station (VVER-
230 reactors), under the supervision of theW  AN01S. This included the twinning of Kozloduy 
with a power station in the Union and  a detailed  engineering study which  Jed  to a thorough 
overhaul of the power station during the shutdown of the reactor (outage programme). 
A consortium of technical support organisations from Union safety authorities contributed its 
expertise to a review of the power station's safety. This action was continued in  the form of 
assistance  to  safety  authorities.  As  a  result  of the  substantial  improvements  achieved, 
Kozloduy unit 2 (VVER-230) was connected to the grid at the end of December 1992·after a 
· one year outage period. 
A small amount of aid  has  been earmarked for  units 5 and  6 of a much  more recent model 
(VVER-320).  ECU 14.8 million has been  allocated  to  Kozloduy  in  1992  bringing the total 
amount since 1990 to ECU 27.5 million. 
•  Czech Republic 
At Temelin, where the more modem VVER-320 reactors are under construction, assistance 
has  been  targeted  on  providing  necessary  management  capacity  for  the  delivery  of 
instrumentation and control  (I&C) systems.  A study of the instrumentation and  control  at 
VVER-213  units  at Dukovany  is  being  carried  out.  Training  was  arranged  for  the Czech 
safety authorities.  · 
•  Slovakia 
Operations  at  Bohunice,  which  has  both  VVER-230  and  VVER-213  units,  focused  on 
improving the safety of the emergency cooling and  containment systems of the VVER-230 
reactors.  A study was  also  launched for the instrumentation and  control for the VVER-213 
reactors.  Extensive  assistance  is  being  given  on  the  Bohunice  site  (VVER-230  and  213 
reactors), involving on-site presence of a large number of experts. 
•  Hungary 
The Paks  power station  (VVER-213)  is,  in  the  opinion  of observers,  one of the  best  run 
plants  in  Eastern  Europe  and  receives  no  direct  assistance  yet  (safety  studies  have  been 
proposed under the PHARE regional programme). 
•  Lithuania 
The two  units  at  lgnalina  are of the  more  recent  RBMK  type  (1500 MWe).  PHARE has 
already  provided  assistance  in  training  operators  for  this  plant.  The  first  phase  of the 
development  of a  compact  simulator  to  enhance  this  training  is  being  financed  and  is 
underway.  In addition, a project of assistance to regulatory authorities will begin shortly. 
ISWorld Association of Nuclear Operators. 
- 18-•  All PHARE countries 
Generic safety studies  (ECU 5 million)  cover the  most  recent  reactors  (VVER-213  and  320) 
in  co-ordination  with  TACIS,  given  that ·TACIS  programme  funds  safety  improvements  on 
the VVER-230 series. 
In  1992  the  safety  authorities  were  singled  out  for  particular  attention,  rece1vmg 
ECU 6.5 million. PHARE 1993 will cover regional  (and country) actions  in a continuation of 
1992 activities, with an emphasis on RBMK,  VVER-230/213 and waste management. 
5.2.b - Euratom loans 
Following the invitation of the European Council held  in Lisbon on 26 and 27 June  1992, the 
Commission  presented  (9  December  1992)  a  proposal  for  a  Council  decision  amending 
Decision  71/270/Euratom  to  authorise  the  Commission  to  contract  Euratom  borr~wings in 
order to contribute to the financing required  for improving the degree of efficiency and safety 
of nuclear power stations in certain non-Member countries. 
A Council  decision  should  be  made  according  to  Article 203  of the  Euratom  treaty.  On  7 
June  1993, the proposal  received  the Council's agreement  in  principle.  The proposal  is  still 
with the European Parliament for consultation. 
While a ceiling for  Euratom borrowings  has  been  fixed  by  the Council  at  4000  MECU,  by 
1.10.1993  2876  MECU  of this  limit  had  been  employed,  leaving  considerable  borrowing 
facilities available for financing nuclear power station improvements. 
5.3 - Other Assistance Programmes 
5.3.n - Bilateral 
The contributions for the period  1991-1993 based on. the data recorded by the G-24 regarding 
firm commitments or better are as follows16: 
Finn  Financing decisions 
commitments  taken 
(ECU million)  (ECU million) 
Europe:m Union  314  181 
Belgium  4.8  1.4 
Denmark  2.0  2.0 
France  26.7  26.4 
Germany  47.6  37.5 
Italy  24.0  11.0 
Netherlands  0.4 
I  0.4 
Spain  1.9  1.9 
United Kingdom  14.8  14.5 
Canada  26  6.2 
Japan  64.8*  64.8 
Nordic countries  22.0  22.0 
Switzerland  6.2  6.2 
United States  32.7  32.7 
IAEA  7.4  7.4 
Total  595.3  415.4 
source: G24 (Commission)  dated : 21  October 1993 
*over 10 years.  ' 
I 
16  including contributions to the multilateral nuclear safety account (see below). 
- 19-Assistance  activities  are  being  carried  out  by  bilateral  donors  along  the  lines  of the  G7 
recommended  action  programme,  and  include  for  instance  twinning,  training  of operators, 
assistance to safety authorities, safety assessments  and  analyses,  transfer of codes,  full  scope 
VVER-320 simulators, fire protection and some supply of safety equipment. 
5.3.b - Nuclear Safety Account 
The Munich Summit recommended the setting up of a Multilateral  Fund  which  is destined  to 
complement bilateral  engagements  (cf.  § 46 of the  Munich  Declaration)  and  concentrates on 
urgent upgrading operations for the least safe reactors (RBMK and VVER-230 types). 
On 27 January 1993 an agreement was  reached on the rules which govern the  Nuclear Safety 
Account (or Fund)  : these essentially  entail  the existence of an  account  administered  by  the 
EBRD and managed by the Assembly of donors or an Operating Committee that might be set 
up; both will reach decisions by consensus.  · 
The Fund  has  been  operational  since April  1993,  when  the  minimum  level  of contributions 
was reached.  The table below lists in detail the amounts assigned to  the Fund.  It should also 
be noted that many non-members of the G7 have already contributed to the Fund. 
Total Contributions to  1993 Contributions to 
the Nuclear Safety  the Nuclear Safety 
Account  Account 
(ECU million)  (ECU million) 
European Union  20**  20** 
Canada  4.7  4.7 
Denmark  2  2 
Finland  1.5  0.5 
France  15  15 
Germany*  31.4  10.5 
Italy  9.9  9.9 
Japan  9.0  3.0 
Netherlands  1.5  1.5 
Norway  2.0  2.0 
Sweden  3.0  3.0 
Switzerland  5.4  5.4 
United Kingdom  ll.5  ll.5 
United States  1.5  0.5 
Total  118.4  89.5 
source: EBRD  dated: 15 October 1993 
* with the condition that the German contribution does  not exceed  15% of the overall  contribution  over three 
years. 
** fmn commitment. 
On  the  basis  of IAEA  studies  and  especially  of the  assistance  of the  PHARE  programme, 
which has over the past three years devoted  more than 27  MECU  to  studies  and  particularly 
to  on-site assistance at  Kozloduy,  the first  action  agreed  upon  by  the Fund on  16 June  1993 
for a total  of ECU 24 million consists of the supply of equipment for  reactors 3 and 4 at the 
plant  (the  most  recent  VVER-230  reactors).  In  return,  the  Bulgarian  authorities  have 
undertaken  a commitment  of principle  to  dismantle  reactors  1 and  2  by  1997.  A second 
action under preparation concerns the reactors  in  lgnalina,  Lithuania.  Furthermore,  projects 
are to be developed in Russia and eventually in the Ukraine. 
-20-It must be kept in  mind  that the Nuclear Safety Account complements the existing bilateral 
programmes, including EU activities. 
5.3.c- International Organisations 
IAEA 
The  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA)  has  intensified  its  relationships  with 
CEEC/CIS since the political changes in  these countries. The Agency has  been able to  carry 
out  several  inspection  missions  (e.  g.  ASSET  and  OSARTS)  in  these  countries.  IAEA 
analyses define and  rank the main safety deficiencies but do not design or evaluate desirable 
engineering upgrades. 
Fellowship programmes  have  been  complemented  by  focused  actions  such  as  probabilistic 
safety analysis  for  VVER reactors  or severe accident  analysis  for  VVER-213 ..  Additional 
extra budgetary activities have been developed for the safety analysis of VVER-230 series in 
1991  (completed), followed  by similar exercises for VVER-213, VVER-320 and  RBMK (on-
going programmes). 
EBRD 
The European  Bank for  Reconstruction  and  Development (EBRD)  administers  the  Nuclear 
Safety  Account.  The  Bank  is  financing  projects  in  the  energy  sector  including  the 
rehabilitation of traditional thermal power plants.  It is  currently considering the financing of 
the completion of the Bohunice NPP in Slovakia. 
IBRD 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or World Bank) has been 
active in the energy sector in the CEEC/CIS. It has not financed projects in the nuclear power 
sector and has no plans at the moment to do so. 
At the request of the G7, the World Bank has produced in collaboration with the International 
Energy  Agency  and  the EBRD  a  comprehensive  economic  analysisl7  on the  nuclear  and 
electricity sector in these countries and devised investment scenarios. 
5.3.d- ISfC 
Since the end of the cold war, Russian and  other CIS  weapon scientists and  engineers have 
seen  their  activities  sharply  curtailed.  They  consequently  live  and  work  in  very  unstable 
conditions, increasing the risks of proliferation of dangerous technologies. 
In order to counter these developments, the Agreement establishing an International Science 
and Technology Centre (ISTC Agreement) was concluded between the European Community, 
the USA, Japan and the Russian Federation. It was signed in December 1992 but is  currently 
still awaiting Russian ratification. 
The  Centre,  once  operational,  will  develop,  approve,  finance,  and  monitor  science  and 
technology  projects  permitting  the  redirection  of the  skills  of weapon  specialists  towards 
civilian projects in the fields of, inter alia, 
•  environmental protection; 
•  energy production; and 
•  nuclear safety. 
17 op.  cit. 
- 21  -The Community budget will finance projects for an amount of ECU 20 million from the 1992 
TACIS funds, once the Agreement enters into force. 
5.4 - Difficulties in Implementing Assistance Programmes 
5.4.a - Liability 
International  nuclear liability conventions18  stipulate that the  responsibility  for  all  damages 
caused  by a  nuclear  incident  are  borne exclusively  by the operator of the  plant  concerned 
(channelling).  Suppliers  of services  or equipment  to  NPPs  are therefore  protected  against 
legal action. 
As most recipient countries are not  party to  the Vienna convention19,  both  Western donors 
and contractors involved in technical assistance and safety upgrading operations risk exposure 
to  legal  actions,  including  by  third  parties,  for  nuclear  damages  which  might  occur  in 
recipient or third countries. There is thus an urgent need for the recipient countries to accede 
to  the  Vienna  convention,  while  introducing  and  implementing  the  relevant  national 
legislation. 
Meanwhile, there is clearly a need to  find  an effective interim solution that provides realistic 
coverage but does not discourage recipient country efforts to move rapidly towards accession. 
The  Commission  has  therefore  requested  recipient  governments  to  directly  indemnify 
contractors vis-?1-vis  ~ird parties in  case of nuclear damages.  While the Commission views 
such indemnity statements  as  the best possible solution  in  the short run,  some contractors 
consider them to lack satisfactory legal coverage and economic credibility. 
In particular, Commission negotiations with the Russian and  Ukrainian authorities to obtain 
such statements have been underway since early  1993.  So far only a limited  indemnity  has 
been provided by the Russian Federation covering neither the installation of equipment nor 
the changing of operating procedures.  The Russian  authorities  have pledged  to  sign  a  full 
indemnity statement by the end of 1993. 
While it has been possible to launch TACIS projects,  it  must be stressed that these projects 
are  now  entering  in-depth  phases  (equipment  supply,  etc.)  and  risk  being  prematurely 
tenninated if a satisfactory full indemnity is not received. 
5.4.b - Industrial Property 
It must be stressed that EU assistance programmes are dependent on a joint collaboration with 
the recipient. Therefore, existing information should be made available by the recipients  to 
EU experts for the purpose of carrying out properly the assistance activities. 
At the basis of the programmes is the concept that infonnation and data generated under EU-
financed  projects  should  be  accessible  and  disseminated  as  widely  as  possible  to  other 
countries concerned in order to ensure maximum benefit and efficiency of allocation.  To this 
end  the  Commission  has  obtained  a  free  license  to  project  outputs  for  the  use  of its 
programmes. 
1B  The ~ituation regarding civil nuclear liability in  Western Europe is based primarily on  the regional 
(OECD) Paris Convention  (1960)  and  the  complementary  Brussels  Convention  (1963).  The Vienna 
Convention (1963) provides for a regime at the international level. 
19 See section 6, below. 
-22-However, the choice of Russian subcontractors is  often very limited, as  existing information 
and  data relevant to  Soviet-designed  NPPs  is  usually  in  the possession of only one or two 
Russian  institutes.  These institutes,  interested  in  safeguarding their  market advantage,  are 
therefore inclined to prevent a wide distribution of design data (the distinction between  input 
and  output data is  naturally problematic) and  even  try to turn their monopoly into  financial 
leverage. 
Clearly such moves  must be opposed, since it  is  fundamental  that this  information  is  made 
readily  available  under  EU  assistance  to  third  countries  which  operate  Soviet-designed 
reactors. 
5.4.c- Co-ordination within recipient countries 
The disruption of old structures, under which nuclear production was centrally managed with 
no  independent control,  has  led  to  a substantial  disorganisation  within  various bodies  and 
more  importantly  between  them  (safety  authorities,  utilities,  designers,  constructors).  This 
situation is particularly apparent in CIS  countries and  renders negotiations and  co-operation 
difficult  at  all  levels,  as  there is  generally  insufficient  co-ordination  between  the different 
actors involved. Political instability can add further uncertainties and unreliability to  medium 
or long term prospects. 
5.4.d- Availability of EU experts 
Unlike other areas of assistance,  there are very few  independent consultants  in  the  nuclear 
safety field,  as utilities and  constructors often rely on internal  expertise.  Therefore, experts 
for assistance programmes have to be drawn directly from EU companies or administrations' 
that have to divert highly experienced and valuable staff from their normal tasks, while at the 
same  time  needing  to  carry  out  their  usual  activities  with  all  due  efficiency  and 
professionalism. 
As a consequence, there is a general limited availability of experts which  in some instances, 
causes delays to programmes or does not allow the full development of all  desired activities. 
5.4.e - Link with Macroeconomic Policy 
Assistance  programmes  cannot  be fully  effective  if nuclear  power  plants  in  the  recipient 
countries lack the financial  means to procure for example basic spare parts and  are forced  to 
reduce maintenance and other safety relevant measures for economic reasons. It is  therefore 
crucial that nuclear plant operators are enabled to work economically, which in turn is largely 
a function of achieving adequate revenues via appropriate electricity pricing. 
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6.1- Energy sector development and international assistance 
The  production  of  electricity  of  nuclear  origin  must  be  considered  in  the  context  of 
competition with alternative sources of electricity, i. e.  traditional power plants. 
Union assistance and co-operation will be developed with the CEEC/CIS in the energy sector, 
including nuclear safety,  in the framework of the various bilateral co-operation or association 
agreements entered into with these countries. 
6.1.a - Economic scenarios 
The World Bank-IEA-EBRD report20  contains a wealth of data and  analysis on  the electrical 
power supply situation  in  the  six  countries  covered,  which  were  chosen  because  they  have 
less safe reactors  (VVER-230, RBMK) : Armenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia and 
Ukraine. 
Economic studies show that future energy demand  is  hard to predict, because of uncertainties 
over the speed  and  extent of economic  recovery,  and  the  rate of decline of energy  intensity 
which  is  expected  to  accompany  the  adoption  of market  economy  conditions.  The  World 
Bank report takes account of this uncertainty,  and  highlights the differences between official 
government forecasts of energy demand, which are high, and those of external experts, which 
are substantially lower. 
The  World  Bank  report  develops,  for  each  country  addressed,  three  nuclear  scenarios, 
describing the extent of utilisation  of the  old  reactors  (RBMK  and  VVER  440/230 types). 
These scenarios (which  include the use of old  and  new  reactors) - high,  moderate and  low -
taking  into  account three  assumptions  of the  level  of future  electricity  demand,  lead  to  an 
evaluation of the capital  investment  and  annual  fossil  fuel  costs  of each  (refer  to  the  World 
Bank report summary). 
There  are  considerable  (acknowledged)  uncertainties  attached  to  assumptions  made  in 
calculating the cost of each scenario. For instance load  forecasts  and  future fossil  fuel  prices 
are very difficult to  predict,  and  investment evaluations  (including  safety upgrades)  rely  on 
specific  assumptions  concerning  local  content,  imported  components  and  the  impact  of 
industrial  co-operation,  including  economies  of scale.  It is  rather  more  likely  that  these 
countries will  use their internal  resources  or develop  industrial  co-operation in  preference to 
paying for imported equipment. 
6.l.b- Promotion or regional co-operation in the field or energy 
The  momentous  changes  in  the  CEEC/CIS  have  tended  to  create  national  energy  policies 
dominated by self-sufficiency concerns which will be increasingly costly to  all  the economies. 
The PHARE and  TACIS  programmes  are  already  active  in  promoting  co-operation  and  co-
ordination of (i) generation expansion planning (it should not be economically logical  for one 
20 op.  cit. 
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network interconnections and power exchanges21,22. 
These efforts should  be pursued,  along  with  the definition  and  implementation of regional 
schemes with multi-national financing and assistance in implementation of suitable framework 
for market-based international transactions. 
6.1.c- Energy efficiency 
A reduction in general energy demand can favourably impact in the medium term on less safe 
nuclear reactors  due to  the effect of inter  fuel  substitution.  Within  the electricity  sector a 
significant reduction in  power demand can create conditions conducive to (i)  reactor outages 
allowing long tenn safety improvements to be made, or (ii) definitive reactor shut down. 
Demand  reduction  first  depends  upon  suitable  institutional  and  organisational  reforms 
(removing institutional disincentives, clarifying the respective roles of Ministries, utilities and 
industries,  establishing  economic  pricing  structures),  and  then  upon  technical  and 
technological  assistance  (audits  in  industries  where  replication  potential  is  high  and  local 
supply of energy services  can  be envisaged,  improvement  in  energy  metering  and  revenue 
collection  etc.).  It  should  be  noted  that  the  scope  for  achieving  energy  efficiency 
improvements in  the CEEC/CIS  is  generally very large,  as  exemplified  by  the high  energy 
consumption per GOP and per capita in these countries relative to the Union. 
The PHARE and TACIS programmes should continue to place emphasis on energy efficiency 
actions, and will coordinate as necessary with other programmes, particularly THERMIE and 
SYNERGY,  which  have  established  programmes  impacting  on  energy  efficiency  in  the 
CEEC/CIS.  . 
6.1.d -Electricity sector restructuring 
The present price charged for electricity  in  some countries does not reflect true total  costs, 
which should take into account the costs of safety improvements and  new  investments. This 
market  distortion should  be corrected  gradually  through  the adoption  of adequate  pricing 
policies and the efficient collection of bills, especially from industry. Therefore governments 
of  the  CEEC/CIS  should  make  every  effort  to  promote  the  improvement  of  utilities 
management, which may,  where appropriate,  be facilitated  by establishing them as  separate 
economic entities, where this is not yet the case. 
Extensive modernisation of and  new  investment  in  the  conventional  thermal  power sector 
(and  hydro  units,  where  applicable)  is  needed  whatever  decisions  are  taken  on  nuclear 
generation, for the following reasons: 
•  Rehabilitation or re-powering of existing thermal  units  will  widen electricity generation 
options  for  these  countries  and,  through  efficiency  gains,  reduce  their  future  fuel 
expenses.  This should decrease incentives to continue operation of less safe NPPs; 
•  Many conventional units are close to the end of their normal design lives; 
21  These countries will  see  a  gradual  increase  in  the  share of domestic  and  commercial  electricity 
consumption  in  the overall  dem:md,  which will result into more  •peaky•  load curves,  necessitating 
specific peaking generation, and will malce even more attractive international exchanges of power  for 
peak-shaving purposes. 
22  Development  of interconnection  gas  and  electricity  networks  will  as  well  mutltiply  exchange 
partners.  This should attenuate  the  motivations  for  national  •self-sufficiency•,  since those  are  often 
provoqued by the perceived risk of depending completely on the will of  an unique supplier. 
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which should be highly profitable; 
•  In most cases,  insufficient attention and  resources have been dedicated  to  the quality of 
construction and maintenance, and this needs to be addressed. 
•  Reliability and availability of the non-nuclear sources of electric power should be ensured 
even in  scenarios where nuclear generation is  continued (peaking constraints, security of 
nuclear auxiliaries supply, back-up during shut-downs for maintenance etc.). 
•  As  awareness  of environmental  constraints  grows,  evolution  towards  the  adoption  of 
Western  European  (equivalent)  standards  will  entail  extensive  improvements  to  power 
stations. 
IFJs23  including  the  European  Investment  Bank  already  finance  investment  projects  for 
alternative sources of electricity which can concern either rehabilitation of existing plants or 
green field operations. Prefeasibility studies could be financed under EU funds. 
A clear priority should be given to investments which are conducive to the early shut down of 
less  safe  nuclear  power plants.  In  particular,  green  field  investments  should  preferably  be 
located in such a way to effectively substitute existing less safe nuclear power plants. 
6.2 - Responsibilities (or nuclear safety 
It is  internationally  recognised  that  overall  responsibility  for  nuclear  safety  rests  with  the 
country in which a nuclear installation is located, and that liability is strictly channelled to the 
operator of the installation24•  As  recipient countries are solely responsible for  any  decision 
taken on their nuclear installations, any assistance or investment financed by the international 
community to  countries operating  nuclear  installations should  not  imply  any  liability  to  be 
borne by the providers of assistance. 
6.2.a - Vienna convention 
EU suppliers of equipment or services should be indemnified against any  consequence of a 
nuclear accident. Therefore every effort should be given to the legal codification of the above 
principles, i.e. the accession of the recipients to  the Vienna convention and  the introduction 
and implementation of the corresponding national legislation. 
Poland  and  Romania  are  Parties  of the  Vienna  Convention  and  Joint  Protocol,  with  full 
provision for channelling and strict liability in national law. Slovenia, Hungary and Lithuania 
are Parties to the Vienna Convention but as  yet have no  implementing  national  legislation. 
Finally, however,  all  of the other countries  involved  have no  international  commitments or 
national laws that provide channelling or strict liability. 
Therefore, practical pressure must be brought to bear upon these recipient countries in  order 
that they  adopt as  quickly  as  possible the  relevant legislation.  Moreover,  in  the  meantime, 
they have to  enter bilateral  arrangements  with  donors to ensure full  indemnity  covering the 
latters' assistance efforts. 
6.2.b - European Energy Charter : Nuclear Protocol 
The  Charter  was  signed  on  17  December  1991  by  almost  fifty  parties  (including  the 
Community  as  a  whole  and  all  the  Republics  of the  former  USSR,  except  one)  and  was 
23  International Financial Institutions. 
24 This is expressed in particular in the Vienna convention (refer also to section 5.4.a). 
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consequently  undertook  the  negotiation  of  a  Basic  Agreement  which  would  define  the 
horizontal  and  institutional  provisions  necessary  for  the  operation  of the  Charter  and  a 
number of specific protocols including nuclear energy and its safety aspects. 
Negotiations  of a  protocol  "on  principles  governing  the  peaceful  use  of nuclear  safety 
facilities"  are today well  advanced,  within the framework of a working group. The section of 
the  text  devoted  to  co-operation  and  co-ordination,  as  well  as  that  on  "principles  of 
responsible nuclear conduct" are almost finalised. 
The draft protocol specifies the measures that the signatories intend to take in order to ensure 
safety throughout the nuclear fuel  cycle. This involves in particular the creation of a suitable 
legislative  or statutory  framework,  the  appropriate  operation  of licensing  and  regulatory 
authorities;  the  rules  on  liability  and  financial  responsibilities;  industrial  co-operation;  the 
establishment  of  emission  and  security  standards;  permanent  training  for· personnel, 
emergency  plans;  impact  assessments;  etc.  A commitment to  subscribe to  the  most  relevant 
international Conventions in the nuclear field  is also provided for. 
Negotiations  of this  nuclear  protocol  have  been  suspended  since  mid  1992;  however,  the 
negotiators considered that  it  is  necessary to wait for  the finalisation of the Basic Agreement 
in order to ensure consistency between the Agreement and provisions contained  in the nuclear 
protocol.  Despite  this  temporary  suspension,  the  negotiations  are  sufficiently  advanced  to 
allow a conclusion of the nuclear protocol, almost at the same time as the Basic Agreement. 
6.2.c - International Nuclear Safety Convention 
In  1990 the Netherlands put forward  the proposal  that the  IAEA  should  convene  in  1991  a 
high-level technical conference on nuclear safety. A conclusion of this Conference was that a 
state's responsibility for  safety of nuclear  instaJiations  should  be formally  reinforced  by  an 
ethical commitment to the international  community based on common safety guidelines.  The 
challenge  of  agreeing  on  clear  objectives,  scope,  obligations  and  benefits  of  such  a 
commitment was left open. 
A 1991  IAEA  resolution started  preparation of the elements of a nuclear safety convention, 
which should act as  an  incentive for  the parties to  increase the safety of civil  nuclear power 
plants.  Given  the advanced  stage of the draft convention,  a resolution of the  IAEA  General 
Conference of October  1993  has  proposed  to  call  a diplomatic  conference  in  early  1994  in 
order to finalise and sign the convention.  On 26 September 1993, the Commission submitted 
to  the  Council  a proposal  for  a negotiation  directive  to  represent  the  Community  at  the 
conference. It is important that the Community as such becomes party to this Convention. 
6.3 - Development of  Nuclear safety Assistance (rom  International Donors 
Short term priorities concern  the safety  improvement of existing units of less safe design,  in 
particular VVER-230 and RBMK. 
Medium and long term perspectives cover the strengthening of safety measures for the newest 
reactors due to be operated until the end of their design life or to be built and  commissioned. 
Due consideration is to be given  in the development of alternative sources of energy. 
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Member States and the recipient countries and will provide an overall and flexible framework 
for coherent joint recipient-donor collaboration towards improvement of nuclear safety under 
the PHARE and TACIS programmes. Eventually, this Master Plan might be extended so as to 
serve as a reference document for discussion with all  donors and recipients in  the framework 
of the  G24  co-<>rdination.  In  any  case,  it  must  be  underlined  that  the  EU's  assistance  is 
guided by the principle of help for self-help. Moreover, the overall responsibility for nuclear 
safety remains with the recipient countries. 
6.3.a - Assistance in improving the safety of existing less safe nuclear installations 
Whatever the actual shutdown date of less safe reactors should be, urgent assistance is  to  be 
granted  to  improve their safety.  It is  unlikely  that  commercial  instruments  can  be  used  to 
finance short term measures,  as  the  return  on  investment  will  be  dubious  for  those  power 
plants which should be closed down before the end of their design life time. Therefore grant 
financing should be devoted to short term urgent improvements  in  addition to  the  measures 
which the recipient countries should carry out themselves. 
Grant assistance can be meaningful  only  if adequate efforts  are undertaken  by  the  recipient 
including: 
installation of minimum legal framework; 
provision of  sufficient budget and staff for regulatory authorities; 
restructuring of utility and power plant management; 
sound  CO-<>peration  as  concerns  the  dissemination  of NPP  information  and  study 
results. 
The EU assistance in improving safety of existing less safe nuclear installations will  continue 
to be developed  along the lines of the G7  action  programme and  will  be based,  inter alia, 
upon the following principles : 
i.  Assistance should allow the transfer of know-how and expertise from Western experts, as 
well as recipient staff training (e.  g. through twinning programmes). The size of the EU 
budget allocated to this type of expert assistance should be maximised yet needs to  take 
into account the limits of available expertise from the EU which can be mobilised and has 
the relevant experience for nuclear safety assistance programmes. 
ii.  As appropriate,  the work of specialised  institutions  of the recipient countries  might  be 
financed  in co-<>peration with Western enterprises, provided that it adds value to existing 
data  and  information,  which  should  be  made  available  free  of charge  as  a  matter  of 
principle. 
iii. The provision of safety equipment should be the primary responsibility of the recipient. 
Assistance  in  equipment  purchase  will  be given  as  a  transitory  measure only  in  areas 
where EU technology clearly contributes to the safety and if no local solution is available. 
Depending on the structure of actions,  the proportion of equipment supply  in  assistance 
programmes could reach 50%. 
iv.  Special  technical  assistance  should  be  made  available  for  the  process  of definitively 
shutting  down  less  safe  nuclear  plants.  Possibly  a  separate  fund  would  need  to  be 
established for this specific purpose. 
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the general safety of the present and future nuclear park 
It is clear that some recipient countries are committed to develop their civil nuclear sector and 
will commission, build and operate reactors of recent design. 
As concerns financing the corresponding investments, a gradual approach should be followed 
which  would  involve  less  foreign  financing  than  outlined  in  the  World  Bank  report25  and 
concentrate  more  on  developing  local  sources  of financing.  In  particular,  industrial  co-
operation with recipient countries should be promoted. 
Are~  ofmedium tenn assistance 
For ·the  newest  reactors,  technical  expertise  should  be  financed  under  EU  programmes 
preferably if they concern : 
•  assistance to the work of safety authorities related to these reactors; 
•  investment project feasibility studies; 
•  industrial co-operation, mainly through joint-venture financing. 
Types of  financiol mechanisms 
Technical assistance to safety authorities will  be financed  through grants. As  concerns safety 
related equipment, pure grant will  normally be excluded but the softening financial  terms of 
EU  supply  contracts  might  be considered.  This  could  for  instance  consist  of interest  rate 
subsidies, cost-sharing with the recipient, co-financing with bilateral aid or financing up front 
costs for IFI-financed projects. 
Such financial  support of equipment supply would  commit the end-user, as  he will  have to 
participate  in  the project  with  his  own  resources  (e.  g.  used  for  repayments  of softened 
loans).  Leverage effect will  also  be ensured for the corresponding EU grant funds,  as they 
come in addition to other sources of finance.  This scheme would develop the transfer of EU 
know-how and expertise. 
Generally, financing of normal  investments should  be made  on a  commercial  basis;  with a 
strong involvement of IFis and  commercial  banks.  Therefore EU grant funds  are normally 
not justified for these actions. Euratom loans will be preferably developed for these kinds of 
projects.  · 
Projed identification 
Both the Union and beneficiary countries must channel these financial  resources  into  an  aid 
and  investment  programme  which  assures  the  rational  use  of funds.  For  actions  in  the 
medium  term,  it will  be  desirable· to  establish,  in  co-operation  with  beneficiaries  and  the 
competent enterprises,  a reference programme for  the  improvement  of power stations  with 
pressurised  water  reactors  (PWRs),  this  programme  to  be  made  up  of fields  of activity 
arranged  in  a  hierarchy  according  to  their  impact  on  safety  and  the  added  value  which 
Community technology will be able to provide. 
This  approach  to  programming  will  allow  specific  actions  on  industrial  co-operation  and 
investment  to  be  put  into  perspective,  thereby  ensuring  the  permanent  monitoring  of the 
utilisation of the financial  resources of the Union and permitting the enterprises concerned, in 
the Union or in the beneficiary countries, to develop the necessary co-operation measures. 
This approach implies the active participation of the beneficiary countries' authorities, first of 
all because it is for them to present eligible projects, but also and especially because they will 
25 op.  cit. 
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will have to favour training and technology transfer. 
6.3.c- Conditionality of assistance in the nuclear safety field 
While the EU has a clear and  immediate interest in helping CEEC/CIS countries in improving 
the safety  of their  nuclear  installations,  grant  assistance  should  be  embedded  in  a  larger 
framework which incorporates objective safety conditions and takes account of long-term EU 
interests.  Some degree of linkage of assistance to  certain  conditions seems appropriate,  in 
particular  to  ensure  the  maximum  efficiency  and  rationality  of nuclear  safety  assistance 
programmes. 
At all  stages of the programmes, it  is  the Commission's intention to  favour  and  bring about 
an environment conducive primarily to the early shutdown of less safe reactors. 
It  is of course clear that differences of opinion between  the EU  and  recipient countries do 
exist with regard to the safety of existing nuclear reactors, their actual  design life time,  new 
investments, electricity ·demand forecasts, etc. For instance, adopting a position of immediate 
shutdown of less safe reactors as a prerequisite to the continuation of assistance programmes 
would probably be ineffective at this stage. 
A  more realistic, graded approach  might  involve the identification of acceptable,  reciprocal 
milestones in the actions of the EU and  recipient countries based on a  number of priorities 
and  with  the  ultimate  aim  of rendering  shutdowns  economically  and  politically  feasible. 
These milestones must be linked to incentives or corrective measures proportionate to actions 
taken or not taken.  Linkages  must  be  highly  credible  and  should  therefore  correspond  to 
measurable  indicators  of achievement  (or  non-achievement)  whose  fulfilment  (or  non-
fulfilment) actually leads to direct responses from the EU. 
Several distinct levels in  the use of linkages can be identified  as  well  as  the corresponding 
incentives/corrective actions : 
Strategic 
On a strategic level, general conditions must be identified  which  correspond to EU  interests 
of improving safety to the greatest extent possible and which are achievable by the recipients. 
These include inter alia the development of realistic pricing policies for electricity and fissile 
materials,  the  restructuring  of utilities,  investment  in  alternative  energy  sources,  energy 
efficiency, and transmission of energy between regions, the creation of an efficient regulatory 
framework,  the  proper  staffing  and  budgeting  of  regulatory  authorities,  and  concrete 
commitments to create appropriate conditions which would enable the early shutdown of less 
safe reactors. 
Corrective  actions  which  could  be  linked  to  the  non-fulfilment  of such  conditions  might 
include the suspension of the programme or a part thereof, or even include actions taken with 
relation  to  other  assistance  areas  or on  a  political  level.  The anticipated  response  should 
naturally reflect a realistic political  will  on  the part of the EU  and  a  reasonable  chance of 
impact on recipient plans. 
Incentive actions  which  could  be also  be  linked  to  the  fulfilment  of these  conditions  on  a 
strategic  level  include  large  scale  investment  projects,  and  the  scope  and  size  of Union 
assistance. 
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On  the  level  of assistance  programmes  encompassing  various  projects,  maximum  overall 
effectiveness should  be ensured,  not only at the  level  of each  recipient country,  but also  for 
the whole  region,  in  particular through  coherent  planning  and  multilateral  co-operation,  as 
well  as  smooth  exchange  of experience,  information  and  results.  As  indicated  above,  the 
Commission  is drafting a Master Plan to this end. 
Various  assistance  and  national  upgrade  activities  on  any  given  individual  reactor  should 
concur to substantially increase the total safety of this reactor whatever its remaining lifetime 
might be.  Every  effort should  be  made to  avoid  extending  the  actual  remaining  lif~times of 
the reactors. 
Corrective corresponding measures  might include suspension of a category of projects (e.  g. 
•design studies), or suspension of the programme, or reduction of the assistance budget in  the 
future,  or  restriction  of futUre  actions  to  specific  areas  (e.  g.  reduced  scope  of equipment 
supply), or reduction of  co~financing share. 
.  . 
Incentives  could  include  for  instance  general  support  to  national  recipient  industries,  for 
instance  through  the  dissemination  of inventions  or findings  with  industrial  applications  in 
other fields. 
Operational 
At  an  operational  level,  the  linkage of projects  to  certain  technical  conditions can  be  more 
clearly defined and immediately required, not least to ensure the full effectiveness, or in some 
cases  even  the continuation, of the  project  itself.  Assistance conditions should  include inter 
alia  clear  recipient  contributions  (facilities,  staff),  satisfactory  legal  protection  against 
potential  third  party  legal  claims,  reasonable  subcontracting  guidelines,  acceptance  of EU 
contracting and purchasing procedures, etc. 
Responses proportionate to  these conditions  might include inter alia suspension of individual 
projects  or  subcontracts,  cancellation  of project  follow~ups,  suspension  of a  category  of 
projects, etc. 
Incentives could include broader scope of co-operations with Union partners. 
6.4 - Aspects o(the supply of  nuclear materials relating to the CEEC/CIS 
The conditionality described  in  the previous section  is  linked  not only  to  the  efficiency  and 
rationality of improvement programmes in the field of nuclear safety, but is also linked to the 
longer term  interests of the Union.  One area of potential  future concern for the Union  is the 
supply of nuclear materials, and  more particularly the stability and security of their markets. 
For the Union,  to which  annual  deliveries of natural  uranium to  users  is some  12,000 tonnes 
(out of a total  requirementof some  15,000 tonnes),  and  which  has  to  import around  80%  of 
its  natural  uranium requirements,  long  term  security of supply has  depended  until  now  on  a 
sufficient diversity of suppliers and  the development of new production capacity in  a number 
of countries possessing important reserves, amongst which are the CEEC/CIS. 
Russia,  Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan,  to  a lesser  extent  Ukraine  and  potentially Tadjikistan  and 
Kyrghyzstan,  possess  natural  uranium  reserves  with  current production  levels  in  excess  of 
domestic  needs.  They  are  therefore  seeking  to  establish  themselves  on  the  international 
~ 31  ~ market,  if only  to  avoid  the  further  increase  of their  stock  levels,  currently  estimated  at 
200,000 tonnes, which is the equivalent of several years of world consumption. 
Moreover, while construction in the nuclear power sector following the accident at Chernobyl 
is  slowing  down,  it  is  likely  that  the  production  and  treatment  of nuclear  materials  is 
continuing, thus increasing the already enormous stocks of enriched uranium. 
For the immediate future,  the Union considers that  its  dependence on  these countries should 
not  exceed  a reasonable  limit,  of the  order  of 20%  of its  total  requirements.  At  the  same 
time,  the  USA  has  closed  its  markets  to  deliveries  at  prices  lower  than  $13/lb  {the  CIS 
currently sells at arounbd $7/lb). 
The  Russian  presence  on  the  international  market  has  been,  until  now,  less  evident  in 
enriched uranium than in  natural  uranium.  However,  it  is  the stock of material  arising  from 
the disannament process which, added  to that emerging  in the civil  sector, could  in  time put 
irresistible  pressure on  the  market.  A completely· new  situation  could  arise,  in  which  one 
country, Russia, would have available stockpiled  material  corresponding to  a relatively large 
number of years of world  consumption,  whose cost  would  be  virtually  nothing  compared  to 
that available elsewhere.  The  USA  will  to  a large  extent  find  itself in  the  same  situation 
without, however, the same need to market its stock. 
Faced with this situation, th·e Union must tackle the problem of the supply of nuclear fuel  in 
its  totality,  and  seek solutions  in  concert  with  the  principal  states  concerned.  It could,  for 
example,  examine  the possibility of utilising  the  powers  available  under  Article  72  of the 
Euratom Treaty - which  in particular provides for the establishment of commercial stocks  by 
the Union - so as to contribute to international control of the situation. 
In  anticipation  of potential  future  market  instabilities,  the  Commission  will  continue  to 
promote the development  and  to  support  the  implementation  of safeguards  and  controls  of 
nuclear  materials  and  installations  in  the  CEEC/CIS.  This  will  include  the  training  of and 
dialogue with competent State authorities and nuclear operators, with the aim of modernising 
the accountancy and  control systems in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear 
materials  and  sensitive technology  ..  This  co-operation  and  support  in  the  field  of nuclear 
safeguards between the Union and the countries concerned should be vigorously pursued. 
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Conclusions 
1.  Nuclear power plants  in the CEEC/CIS,  most notably the oldest designs, do  not satisfy 
current  design  and  operational  safety  standards  in  the  West.  Nuclear  fuel  cycle  and 
waste treatment facilities are either non-existent or else do not meet Western standards. 
2.  However,  the  nuclear  energy  and  nuclear safety situation  in  the  CEEC/CIS  cannot  be 
divorced from  the  wider energy  picture,  in  which  the future  energy demand  is  rather 
unpredictable.  Despite high  inflation,  energy  prices  are  still  too  low  to  make  energy 
efficiency investments attractive, and  energy supply and  use remains inefficient.  Many 
of the smaller  countries  are dependent on  increasingly  expensive  energy  impons,  and 
are therefore emphasising energy autonomy. 
3.  Consequently all  these countries are,  to a greater or Jesser extent, dependent on nuclear 
generated  electricity.  Despite  the  wishes  of the  international  community,  immediately 
closing less safe nuclear power plants will  be economically very difficult, as  illustrated 
by the recent decision of Ukraine to continue operation of the undamaged RBMK units 
at  Chernobyl,  reversing an earlier contrary decision.  In  view of this, the Union cannot 
practically  make  the  quick  closure  of NPPs  a definitive  precondition  for  aid,  since 
neither technical  aid nor the working of the energy market will guarantee the supply of 
the required electricity. 
Recommendations 
1.  Given these realities, the Union should pursue nuclear safety through the actions of the 
PHARE and  TACIS  programmes,  and  effons should  be  made  to  overcome the  delays 
which  are being  experienced  due  to  the lack of co-ordination or commitment  in some 
recipient  countries,  particularly  Russia  and  Ukraine.  Member  states  could,  through 
bilateral relationships with beneficiary countries, assist the Commission by encouraging 
specific conditions for assistance in the nuclear field to be met, namely: 
•  In  accordance  with  international  practice,  recipient  countries  should  explicitly 
accept all the nuclear responsibility for potential damages  resulting from  a nuclear 
accident, whatever the involvement of EU consultants or suppliers. 
•  Results  arising  from  EO-financed projects should  be  made available as  necessary 
to all  involved parties for the purpose of improving safety at other installations. 
2.  More  generally,  a  graded  set  of  conditions  and  corresponding  corrective  measures 
should be established  in order to ensure the effectiveness of EU  assistance programmes 
and the general improvement of nuclear safety in recipient countries, which concur with 
the ultimate objective of closing down as early as is feasible the less safe reactors. 
-33-3.  The  Union  should  continue  its  support  for  the  development  of  legally  based, 
independent, technically strong and  well  resourced safety authorities in  the CEEC/CIS. 
The  coherence  between  the  short-term  assistance  and  the  long-term  co-operation 
between European safety authorities should  be mainly ensured through  the mechanism 
of the  Groups  for  Regulatory  Assistance  Management  (RAM)  and  Concertation  on 
European Regulatory Tasks (CONCERn. 
4.  In  order  to  facilitate  the  implementation  of  an  integrated  global  approach,  the 
Commission will  further promote,  through the PHARE and  TACIS  programmes, two-
way exchanges of engineers and  key personnel between the Union and the CEEC/CIS. 
5.  In addition to activities directly concerning nuclear power plants, assistance will also be 
provided to reduce radioactive pollution due to fuel  cycle activities and to develop safe 
spent fuel and waste management systems at national and regional levels. 
6.  The Union should intensify co-ordination of assistance with non-member States through 
the G24 mechanism, including the future evaluation of assistance efforts. 
7.  As specifically concerns less safe civil nuclear installations, grant assistance managed by 
the  Commission  should  be  continued  under  the  following  terms  and  within  the 
framework of a multiannual and regional approach, in co-ordination with other donors: 
•  All urgent expert assistance identified will be financed as far as possible, but needs 
to take into account the limited availability of appropriate EU nuclear specialists. 
•  Equipment will  be granted  preferentially  in  areas  where the Union  adds  a  clear 
technological  value  to  existing  local  capabilities.  Except  in  cases  of extreme 
urgency,  no  supply of equipment  will  be made which  would be conducive to  a 
substantial prolongation of the life time of the power plant. 
•  Projects of the  Nuclear Safety Account should be developed in  a complementary 
way to bilateral activities. 
8.  As specifically  concerns  relatively safer nuclear  power plants,  it is  important,  in  the 
longer tenn, to move from studies to  investment.  In view of this, the Commission will 
establish an integrated, global  approach which leads to industrial  investments. Such an 
approach must encourage efficient co-operation between the Union and  the beneficiary 
countries in order to build bridges between the different technologies. Assistance will be 
given in order to ensure the safest possible production of electricity of nuclear origin in 
the CEEC/CIS : 
•  Operational safety,  including training and  assistance in plant management will  be 
directly financed through grant funds. 
•  Supply of EU  equipment of urgent safety relevance can  benefit from  preferential 
terms of financing using grant funds. 
•  Joint-ventures between  EU  and  beneficiary  country  enterprises will  be promoted 
particularly if their activities are of direct relevance for nuclear safety. 
!"  Euratom loans should be used as soon and as  extensively as possible, with priority 
given to safer reactors. 
-34-•  Normal  investment  projects  should  only  be  assisted  by  EU  grant  funds  at  the 
feasibility  stage,  leaving  IFis  and  commercial  banks  with  the  responsibility  of 
project financing. 
9.  In  the wider energy  field,  Union  financial  instruments,  including TACIS  and  PHARE, 
should  aim  to  counteract  the  perceived  need  for  energy self sufficiency and  create the 
conditions  in  which  the  CEEC/CIS  can  consider  closing  older  nuclear  plants.  This 
should  be  done  by  continuing  (notably  through  regional  programmes)  to  promote  co-
operation and co-ordination of gas interconnection, power generation planning,  network 
interconnections and power exchanges between neighbouring countries. 
10.  The Union financial  instruments, should continue to  put particular emphasis on  energy 
efficiency in all sectors, notably through economic energy pricing, in recognition of the 
large potential for reducing electricity demand, and the impact of this on closure of less-
safe nuclear plants. 
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VVER 230/440 
Unit I  Generation I  CoupUng to  Status 
Country  Power  Grid 
Kozloduy-1 (Bul.)  230 (440 MWe)  07.1974  operational 
Kozloduy-2 (Bul.)  230 (440 MWe)  09.1975  operational 
Kozloduy-3 (Bul.)  230 (440 MWe)  12.1980  operational 
Kozloduy-4 (Bul.)  230 (440 MWe)  05.1982  operational 
Bohunice-1 (Siova.)  230 (430 MWe)  12.1978  operational 
Bohunice-2 (Slova.)  230 (430 MWe)  03.1980  operational 
Kola-1 (Rus.)  230 (440 MWe)  06.1973  operational 
Kola-2 (Rus.)  230 (440 MWe)  12.1974  operational 
Novovoronezh-3 (Rus.)  179 (300 MWe)  12.1971  operational 
Novovoronezh-4 (Rus.)  179 (417 MWe)  12.1972  operational 
Oktemberyan-1 (Arm.)  230 (417 MWe)  12.1976  shutdown 
Oktemberyan-2 (Arm.)  230(440 MWe)_  12.1979  shutdown 
VVER 2131440 
Unit/  Generation I  Coupling to  Status 
Country  Power  Grid 
Paks-I (Hun.)  213 (440 MWe)  12.1982  operational 
Paks-2 (Hun.)  213 (450 MWe)  09.1984  operational 
Paks-3 (Hun.)  213 (460 MWe)  09.1986  operational 
Paks-4 (Hun.)  213 (460 MWe)  08.1987  operational 
Dukovany-1 (Cz.)  213 (440 MWe)  02.1985  operational 
Dukovany-2 (Cz.)  213 (440 MWe)  01.1986  operational 
Dukovany-3 (Cz.)  213 (440 MWe)  11.1986  operational 
Dukovany-4 (Cz.)  213 (440 MWe)  06.1987  operational 
Bobunice-3 (Siova.)  213 (430 MWe)  08.1984  operational 
Bohunice-4 (Siova.)  213 (430 MWe)  08.1985  operational 
Mocbovce-1 (Siova.)  213 (440 MWe)  - under construction 
Mochovce-2 (Slova.)  213 (440 MWe)  - under construction 
Mochovce-3 (Siova.)  213 (440 MWe)  - under construction 
Mochovce-4 (Siova.)  213 (440 MWe)  - under construction 
Kola-3 (Rus.)  213 (440 MWe)  03.1981  operational 
Kola-4 (Rus.)  213 (440 MWe)  10.1984  operational 
Rovno-1 (Ukr.)  213 (402 MWe)  12.1980  operational 
Rovno-2 (Ukr.)  213 (416 MWe)  12.1981  operational 
- 36-VVER 320/1000 
Unit I  Genemtion I  Coupling to  Status 
Country  Power  Grid 
Kozloduy-5 (Bul.)  320 (1000 MWe)  11.1987  operational 
Kozloduy-6 (Bul.)  320 (1000 MWe)  03.1989  operational 
Temelin-1 (Cz.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Temelin-2 (Cz.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Balakovo-1 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  12.1985  operotional 
Da1akovo-2 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  01.1988  operational 
Dalakovo-3 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  12.1988  operational 
Balakovo-4 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Balakovo-5 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Dalakovo-6 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Kalinin-1 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  05.1984  opemtional 
Kalinin-2 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  12.1986  operotional 
Kalinin-3 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Kalinin-4 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Novovoronezh-5 (Rus.}  320 (1000 MWe)  05.1980  operational 
Novovoronezh-6 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Novovoronezh-7 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Kostroma-1  (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Kostroma-2 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Tatar-1 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Tatar-2 (Rus.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
K.hmelnitski-1 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  12.1987  operational 
K.hmelnitski-2 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
K.hmelnitski-3 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Khmelnitski-4 (Ukr.}  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Rovno-3 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  11.1986  operotional 
Rovno-4 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
South-Ukraine-1 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  12.1982  opemtional 
South-Ukraine-2 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  01.1985  operational 
South-Ukraine-3 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  09.1989  operotional 
South-Ukraine-4 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Zaporozhe-1 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  12.1984  operational 
Zaporozhe-2 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  07.1985  operational 
Zaporozhe-3 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  12.1986  operotional 
Zaporozhe-4 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  12.1987  operational 
Zaporozhe-5 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  08.1989  operational 
Zaporozhe-6 (Ukr.)  320 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
-37-RBMK 
Unit/  Generation I  Coupling to  Status 
Country  Power  Grid 
Cbemobyl-1 (Ukr.)  1 (1000 MWe)  09.1977  operational 
Chemobyl-2 (Ukr.)  1 (1000 MWe)  12.1978  shutdown 
Chemobyl-3 (Ukr.)  2 (1000 MWe)  12.1981  operational 
Cbemobyl-4 (Ukr.)  2 {1000 MWe)  12.1983  shutdown 
Kursk-1 {Rus.)  1 {1000 MWe)  12.1976  operational 
Kursk-2 (Rus.)  1 (1000 MWe)  01.1979  operational 
Kursk-3 (Rus.)  2 (1000 MWe)  10.1983  operational 
Kursk-4 (Rus.)  2(lOOOMWe)  12.1985  operational 
Kursk-5 (Rus.)  3 (1000 MWe)  - under construction 
Leningrad-1 (Rus.)  1 (1000 MWe)  12.1973  operational 
Leningrad-2 (Rus.)  1 (1000 MWe)  07.1975  operational 
Leningrad-3 (Rus.)  2 (IOOOMWe)  12.1979  operational 
Leningrad-4 (Rus.)  2(1000MWe)  02.1981  operational 
Smolensk-I (Rus.)  2 (1000 MWe)  12.1982  operational 
Smolensk-2 (Rus.)  2 (1000 MWe)  05.1985  operational 
Smolensk-3 (Rus.)  3 (1000 MWe)  06.1990  operational 
lgnalina-1 {Lit.)  2 {1500 MWe)  12.1983  operational 
l~alina-2  (Lit.) 
1  2(1500MWe)  08.1987  operational 
Fast breeder 
Unill  Generation I  Coupling to  Status 
Country  Power  Grid 
Shevchenko (Kaz.)  350 (150 MWe)  07.1973  operational 
Beloyarsk-3 (Rus.)  600 (600 MWe)  04.1980  operational 
Beloyarsk-4 (Rus.)  800 (800 MWe)  under construction 
Soutb-Ural-1 (Rus.)  800 (800 MWe)  under construction 
Soutb-Ural-2 (Rus.)  800 (800 MWe}  under construction 
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The development of Union energy policy should  be  founded  on  four  basic principles,  all  of 
which have relevance to  nuclear safety in  the CEEC and  CIS, and the Union's relations with 
those countries.  llwse arc:  (i)  international  interdependence in  global  energy  markets, and 
the reduction of uncertainty through  producer/consumer dialogue, and  notably application of 
the principles of the European Energy Charter, (ii) the market principle, (iii) the relationship 
between  energy  and  the  environment,  which  transcends  national  boundaries,  and  (iv)  the 
security of supply of energy to the Union to maintain a high level of energy services. 
There are potential security of supply implications of rising dependency on imported energy. 
It is predicted that Union total  primary energy demand  will  rise at between  1.3%  and  1.6% 
p.a. to 2005, and that import dependency will  rise from around 50% in  1990 to perhaps 75% 
by 2020. Within this picture is  the  Union's increasing consumption of natural  gas  (by  up  to 
60% by 2005), largely due to the use of gas in  power generation.  Meeting this demand will 
require that imports double, from some 108 bern in  1991  (about 40% of total consumption) to 
nearly 200 bern in 2005. 
The  single  largest  supplier  of  natural  gas  to  the  EU  is  the  CIS  (principally  Russia), 
accounting for about half of all  imports  (or  17%  of total  consumption), and  this is  likely to 
rise with  increasing demand.  Any action taken to shut high-risk nuclear power plants  in  the 
CEEC and CIS and to substitute combined-cycle gas turbine plants would  result  in  increased 
gas consumption. 
Supposing (an extreme example) that all  high-risk nuclear reactors were shut, there would be 
an  overall  additional gas  requirement of (very  approximately)  30 bern/year.  Although  this 
amount  represents  only  3  - 4%  of the  total  CIS  production  of about  800  bern/year,  it  is 
nevertheless some 60%  of the CIS's current gas  exports to  the EU.  A dramatic increase in 
gas use for power generation by the CEEC and  CIS  could therefore exert some pressure on 
the continental gas market. 
An obvious  concern of the  Union  therefore,  is  for  the  political  stability  and  reliability  of 
major  suppliers,  which  highlights  the  importance  of energy  in  the  evolving  geopolitical 
framework and in external relations. For instance, with  regard to regards natural gas, export 
from the CIS to the EU via trans-boundary pipelines involves several countries, so security of 
supply depends on political stability in a large region as well as single countries. The EU can 
exercise  influence  over  the  political  stability  of the  region,  notably  through  its  various 
bilateral  agreements  and  the  European  Energy  Charter,  but also  most  importantly  through 
energy trade and investment, which will  be a key means of ensuring economic progress. 
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NUCLEAR SAFETY AND ELECTRIC POWER IN 
ARMENIA. BULGARIA, LITHUANIA, RUSSIA, SLOVAKIA, AND UKRAINE 
Strategies and Financing - Summary Report 
Abstract 
This report makes the following main points: 
+  Of a  total of nearly 300 gigawans (GW)  of generating capacity 
in six countries (Armenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, 
and Ukraine), approximately 19 GW or 6% (9% without 
Russia) are at plants with higher-risk nuclear reactors (RBMK  or 
VVER 440/230 types).  There is a spectrum of alternative 
strategies for addressing the nuclear safety aspects of these 
and other nuclear plants; the table below summarizes the costs 
and characteristics of three such strategies. 
The Low N~clear Scenario addresses the nuclear safety risks most 
aggressively by closing hlgher risk nucJear plants by the mid-1990s or 
shortly thereafter, depending on individual  country circumstances. 
Total power sector investment requirements under this scenario 
would be about US$21 billion  from. 1993 to 2000.  This strategy 
involves higher fuel costs, an adverse balance of payments (BOP} 
impact. which increases from the mid-1990s, and resistance within 
the countries. 
+  Decision-makers in the fiye fuel-importing  countries have 
general concerns about the BOP effects of higher fuel 
imports, which the low Nuclear Scenario would exacerbate. 
They arc also concerned about increasing dependence on 
Russia for fuel supply and, for these and other reasons, 
favor greater reliance on nuclear energy.  In  Russia. current 
energy policy has opted for a high  nuclear course because 
of views that the risks of their nuclear reactors are not 
excessive while costs are favorablo, because of concerns 
about future fuel exports: and because of a preference to 
close older coal-fired plants. +  A High  Nuclear Scenario (which -approximates the stance taken to 
date by most of  the Governments concerned) would include 
upgrading  and continuing  operation of all  existing nuclear plants to 
the end of  their design lives, as well as expanding  nuclear capacity. 
Total power sector investment requirements under this scenario 
would be about US$28 billion  over the 1993-2000 pe:-iod.  Due to 
lower fuel  costs. the High  Nuclear Scenario has lower overall costs in 
narrow economic terms and involves less BOP impact. but is  the 
riskiest from  the safety point of  view and involves the largest 
investment financing  with a high. proportion  of this being  for  nuclear 
plant. with the risk of future cost escalation due to increasing safety 
standards.  This strategy would  face serious constra.ints in  foreign 
financing. 
+  If  it would not be feasible to implement the Low or High  Nuclear 
options due to country resistance and/or financing  problems. a  phased 
or Moderate approach might be considered whereby the higher risk 
plm~~s me shut down by about 2000.  This strategy would involve 
higher nuclear risks than the Low Scenario. but would have 
investment ($23 billion).  fuel costs and imported fuel  requirements 
which fall  in  between those of the Low and High Scenarios. 
The differenGes in  investment costs between the Low, Moderate and 
High  Nuclear Scenarios are not large.  Investment requirements alone 
cannot be a basis for decisions about the appropriate strategy.  While 
faster closure of higher risk plants and less reliance on new nuclear 
capacity have adverse implications for operating costs and the balance of 
payments. they lead to a faster reduction in  nuclear safety risks. 
Under either the Low or Moderate Strategy, assuming that at least 
the latter would prove feasible. it would be practicnl to address 
financing strategies in  tranches.  In  tho first stage (1993-1995). the 
investment requirements of $6.2-7.2 billion  could possibly be 
financed by power utility  cash generation and government 
contributions (about US$3.4-3.7 billion),  tho international financial 
institutions (about US$1.3-1 .5 billion);  export credit agencies and 
commercial banks (about US$1 .3-1.5 bilfion);  multilateral and bilateral 
grant assistance for nuclear safety upgrades (about $0.5-1.0 billion); 
and possibly some private investment (assumed to be  negligible  in  the 
short term).  Investment programs and financing strategies for  19~3-
2000 would have to be addressed in  the light of progress under tL'! 
first phase.  Those countries willing  to pursue a suitable agenda for 
nuclear safety, policy reforms. and power systom planning  would 
deserve stronger support.  Some countries. however. would be less 
able to take on additional  debt.  Funding  to assist the countries for 
~I the increased cost of fuel imports could be considered in  the context 
of macroeconomic adjustment programs, but also as support for 
nuclear safety strategies. 
+  The extent to which reform is  pursued will largely determine the 
future course of energy prices, electricity demand and, hence. 
investment requirements.  Efficient electricity pricing  and other power 
sector reforms are also crucial to mobilizing  financial  resources. 
Targeted efforts to improve electricity end-use efficiency could reduce 
future fuel and capital requirements, and there is a case for 
international  assistance to promote these efforts.  · 
+  Effective mobilization of funds would benefit from coordination 
between the countries and the various sources so that coherent 
strategies are followed regarding safety investments, alternative 
supplies, and plant closures. 
Cost:s zmd  CharactoristiC3 of Altomativo Nuclear Scenn~os 
Higher Risk Plants dosed by: 
Risk of Nuclear Incidents: 
Investment Cost 
($ billion. 1993-2000) 
Of which: 
Nuclear upgrodos and 
completions (%) 
Conventional (%) 
Annual Fossil Fuel Cost 
($ billion, 1995-2000 avorage) 
Annual Fossil Fuellmport.Cost 




.,  1995-97 
Lowest Risk 
21 
25 
75 
12.9 
3.2 
Resistant 
Moderate 
Nuclear 
2000 
Higher Risk 
23 
33 
67 
11.6 
2.8 
Might consider 
High 
Nuclear 
2010 + 
Highest Risk 
28 
63 
37 
9.8 
2.3 
Preferred 